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【金融系学术讲座】 讲座题目:Board Structure, Payout Policy, and Performance during the Crisis
日期: 2019-03-29

讲座题目:Board Structure, Payout Policy, and Performance during the Crisis:An Unintended Consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Exchange Listing Rules


Noncompliant firms required to raise board independence by the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules significantly increased their dividend payouts and held less cash reserves. As the crisis unfolded, they were more likely to reduce investment and ultimately underperformed compliant firms. The underperformance was more severe for noncompliant firms facing higher costs of external financing and those with greater growth opportunities. Our evidence suggests that regulations requiring independent boards facilitate higher dividends and thereby mitigate agency costs of free cash flow. However, they may also make firms more dependent on external financing and more susceptible to adverse external financing shocks.


Jie Chen(陈洁),英国利兹大学(University of Leeds)公司金融副教授。2014年获得布里斯托大学(University of Bristol)金融学博士学位, 曾在卡迪夫大学(Cardiff University)担任助理教授。致力于公司金融、公司治理和制度改革方面的研究。在被英国商学院协会(ABS)列为国际顶尖和一流的学术期刊上发表多篇论文并担任审稿人,如Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance 和 Journal of Empirical Finance等;曾获得金融管理学会年会(FMA Annual Meeting)最佳论文奖。