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【金融系学术讲座】讲座题目:Sword of Damocles: Job Security and Earnings Management
日期: 2019-04-19


? ? 李荻教授毕业于美国密歇根大学(安娜堡)罗斯商学院,获得工商管理(金融专业)博士。他于2017年加入北京大学汇丰商学院,任金融学助教授。此前,他曾供职于美国佐治亚州立大学,任罗宾森商学院金融系助理教授。李荻教授的研究领域包括公司财务、公司治理、兼并收购、结构性估算,曾在The Journal of Financial Economics,Management Science,Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,China Economic Quarterly等著名期刊上发表论文,曾入选沃顿研究数据中心“卓越学者计划”(WRDS Advanced Research Scholar Program),并获得最佳论文奖。


? ? Job security concerns may have a disciplinary or opportunistic effect on CEOs’ behavior. We study these two effects in the setting of earnings management. We find that an increase in CEO dismissal hazard is associated with smaller income-inflating accruals and less real earnings management, which is consistent with the disciplinary effect. In contrast, the opportunistic effect exists but only when dismissal risk is extremely high. Overall, our evidence supports the notion that forced turnover is an effective corporate governance measure that deters CEOs from engaging in misbehaviors.